Calculability as Politics in the Construction of Markets: The Case of Socially Responsible Investment in France by Gond, J-P. & Giamporcaro, S.
Gond, J-P. & Giamporcaro, S. (2016). Calculability as Politics in the Construction of Markets: The 
Case of Socially Responsible Investment in France. Organization Studies, 37(4), pp. 465-495. doi: 
10.1177/0170840615604498 
City Research Online
Original citation: Gond, J-P. & Giamporcaro, S. (2016). Calculability as Politics in the Construction 
of Markets: The Case of Socially Responsible Investment in France. Organization Studies, 37(4), 
pp. 465-495. doi: 10.1177/0170840615604498 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12926/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
1 
 
Calculability as Politics in the Construction of Markets: 
The Case of Socially Responsible Investment in France 
 
 
 
Stéphanie Giamporcaro 
Graduate School of Business  
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Private Bag, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa 
Tel: +27 (0) 21 406 1180 
Fax: +27 (0) 21 406 1412 
stephanie.giamporcaro@gsb.uct.ac.za 
www.gsb.uct.ac.za 
 
 
 
Jean-Pascal Gond 
Cass Business School 
City University London 
106 Bunhill Row, EC1Y 8TZ 
London, United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7040 0980 
Fax: +44 (0) 7040 8328 
jean-pascal.gond.1@city.ac.uk 
 
 
Paper accepted for publication and forthcoming in Organization Studies. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank our Organization Studies acting editor on this paper, Professor David Courpasson, 
for his guidance and help through the review process, as well as two anonymous reviewers for 
their valuable insights.  Earlier drafts of this paper benefitted of useful comments from Liliana 
Doganova, Peter Karnøe and the other attendees of the panel on ‘Calculability and 
Performativity’ at the conference of the Society for the Social Studies of Sciences (SSS) held 
in 2013 (San Diego), as well as from two presentations of our research at Principle for 
Responsible Investing (PRI) academic conference in 2013 (Paris) and 2010 (Copenhagen).  
We also acknowledged the useful comments from Dianela Laurel-Fois and the other 
participants of the sub-theme 51 at the 2015 EGOS Conference (Athens) as well as helpful 
informal discussions with Peter Fleming and Emilio Marti. 
 
  
2 
 
Authors’ biographies 
 
Stéphanie Giamporcaro is Associate Professor and Research Director at the University of 
Cape Town Graduate School Of Business. Her theoretical roots are in sociology of markets 
and consumption, social studies of finance, economic sociology and French pragmatic 
sociology. She has published a book on political consumption and various peer reviewed 
academic articles. Her research focuses particularly on how sustainable and responsible 
investment (SRI) and impact investing practices are currently be implemented in the 
developed and emerging economies. Prior to that, she was the head of SRI research for the 
French think-tank Novethic, a subsidiary of the French Public Investment Group Caisse des 
Dépots. 
 
Jean-Pascal Gond is Professor of Corporate Social Responsibility at Cass Business School, 
City University London (UK). His research mobilizes organization theory and economic 
sociology to investigate corporate social responsibility (CSR). His research in economic 
sociology is concerned with the influence of theory on managerial practice (performativity), 
the governance of self-regulation, and the interplay of society’s commodification and 
markets’ socialization. He has published in academic journals such as Business and Society, 
Business Ethics Quarterly, Economy and Society, Journal of Management, Journal of 
Management Studies, Organization, Organization Science, and Organization Studies and 
French journals such as Finance Contrôle Stratégie. 
 
 
  
3 
 
Calculability as Politics in the Construction of Markets: 
The Case of Socially Responsible Investment in France 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines some of the processes by which power constitutes calculability and, in 
so doing, shapes the construction of markets.  We combine insights from performativity 
studies about calculability with Lukes’ ‘radical view of power’ to investigate how multiple 
facets of power are mobilized to influence the creation and activities of calculative agencies in 
the process of market construction.  An in-depth longitudinal study of the French socially 
responsible investment market shows how organizations acting as calculative agencies 
become sites of power through calculability.  We identify how power is exercised over, 
through and against these calculative agencies by a variety of actors in order to build their 
position in the socially responsible investment market.  Our results complement the broader 
question of the ‘government of economic life’ by showing how micro-level power games 
interact with the macro-politics of market building through calculative agencies.  In so doing, 
our paper sheds light on neglected aspects of the changing geopolitics of calculative power in 
market construction and suggests approaching ‘calculability as politics’ when studying the 
construction of markets. 
 
Key words: Calculability – Economic Sociology – Politics – Power – Socially Responsible 
Investment 
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Calculability as Politics in the Construction of Markets: 
The Case of Socially Responsible Investment in France 
 
Although calculative practices have been recognized as ‘key ingredients’ in the process of 
market construction (Callon, 1998; Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Fourcade, 2007), the political 
implications of considering calculative agencies in the making of markets have not yet been 
fully investigated (Cochoy, Giraudeau & McFall, 2010).  Studies informed by the 
Foucauldian approach to power as ‘subjectification’ (Foucault, 1978, 1979) have documented 
how calculative agencies contribute to ‘govern economic life’ (Miller, 1992; Miller & Rose, 
1990) within markets by creating ‘inequalities in calculative power’ (Van Hoyweghen, 2014) 
or by promoting a disciplinary ‘ideology of numbers’ (Chelli & Gendron, 2013). 
Although these works connect micro processes for the constitution of power based on 
calculative devices to broader ideological trends such as the diffusion of a neo-liberal 
ideology (Miller & Power, 2013; Miller & Rose, 1990), they tend to overlook that calculative 
agencies operating within markets are also ‘organizations’ (Ahrne, Aspers & Brunsson, 
2015).  As such, they can mobilize facets of power other than subjectification to promote their 
own interests, compete with each other to produce and/or to benefit from calculative 
asymmetries, and be enabled or constrained by other actors to achieve specific ends. In 
addition, performativity studies of markets (Fourcade, 2007) have rarely engaged with studies 
of ‘markets-as-politics’ that focus on the construction of regulations and insist on the role of 
macro actors such as governments or labour unions in their accounts of market construction 
(Fligstein, 1996, 2001).  As a result, the macro politics of market making has rarely been 
studied in relation to the micro dynamics of power constitution through calculative practices. 
This paper starts addressing these limitations by examining how power and calculability 
interface in the process of market construction.  Central to our study of the politics of 
calculative agencies are Lukes’ (2005) critical discussion of Foucault’s (1978) analysis of 
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power – according to which multiple alternative facets of power such as coercion, 
manipulation and domination potentially relate to calculative practices – and Fleming and 
Spicer’s (2014) suggestion that power does not only necessarily occur ‘within’ organizations 
but also over, through or against organizations. 
To analyse how calculative agencies engaged with multiple forms of power while being 
subjected to broader political forces, we conducted a longitudinal analysis of the French 
market for Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) between 1997 and 2008.  Our findings 
show how major macro actors such as state-owned banks or labour unions promoted their 
interests by exercising their power and shaping the process of market development through 
their influence against, over or through the multiple calculative agencies that were in charge 
of the evaluation of the ‘socially responsible quality’ of corporate stocks or SRI funds.  Our 
results also show that calculative agencies became organizational ‘sites of power’ and relied 
on multiple facets of power to consolidate their market position through the creation and 
maintenance of calculative asymmetries that made other actors dependent on them.  
In examining how multiple forms of power interact with calculability in the construction 
of a market, this paper seeks to contribute to the analysis of the ‘changing geopolitics of 
calculative power’ (Callon & Muniesa, 2005: 1238) in at least two ways.  First, we contribute 
to the analysis of power by highlighting how multiple facets of power are engaged in relation 
to calculability.  Our analysis complements prior research focused on how ‘power as 
subjectification’ is enacted through calculative practices (Miller & Power, 2013) by adopting 
the three-dimensional view on power proposed by Lukes (2005) and by documenting how 
calculative agencies also mobilize coercion by shaping access to resources or uncertainty; 
manipulate other actors by shifting these actors’ position within the calculative supply chain 
to design and redesign calculative asymmetries to their own benefit; and are potentially 
mobilized by attempts to dominate the market by other powerful actors. 
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Second, in line with recent calls (Krippner, 2005, 2011; Vollmer, Mennicken & Preda, 
2009; Vosselman, 2014), our analysis contributes to further cross fertilize studies ranging 
from the micro politics of calculative practices to the macro politics of market building by 
specifying how forms of power are constituted by but also deployed through, over and against 
calculative agencies.  In so doing, our study uncovers new aspects of the power-calculability 
nexus and moves towards an approach of ‘calculability as politics’ for studying market 
construction.  Calculative activities are not only a means to exercise power, they also 
constitute autonomous ‘sites of power’ producing unintended political effects that may 
influence market construction. 
Politics and Calculability in the Construction of Markets 
Central to early economic sociology accounts of market construction is the notion that the 
development of markets, as with any other economic activity, can hardly be analysed without 
considering the social, institutional and political context within which it takes place (Polanyi, 
1957).  The political sociology of markets developed by Fligstein (1990, 1996, 2001), in 
particular, insists on the importance of defining governance rules that embed a ‘conception of 
corporate control’ (Fligstein, 1990) to make the construction of markets possible. This view 
also highlights the central role of the government and other powerful macro-social groups of 
actors such as labour unions or corporate lobbies in the process of market construction and 
transformation.  According to this view of ‘markets-as-politics’, ‘social relations within and 
across firms and their more formal relations to the state are pivotal to understanding how 
stable markets emerge’ (Fligstein, 1996: 656).  Market consolidation, transformation or 
collapse can be interpreted in relation to deliberate moves by powerful macro-social actors 
(Fligstein, 1990, 2001).  For instance, Morgan (2008) highlights the indirect yet central role of 
national governments in the organization of a multilateral association that made it possible to 
create a market for over-the-counter derivatives, and Brès and Gond (2014) show how 
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consultants actively mobilize regulations in the social and environmental domains to build 
new business opportunities. 
In recent years, another perspective on the construction of markets inspired by the field of 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies has emerged around the umbrella of 
‘performativity studies’ (Gond, Cabantous, Learmonth & Harding, 2015), shifting the focus 
of analysis from how institutions, networks or politics construct markets to the question of 
‘how markets construct societies’ (Fourcade, 2007: 1024), notably by pointing to the role of 
calculative devices in market making (Callon, 1998, 2007, 2013).  According to this view, 
markets are conceived as ‘collective calculative devices’ (Callon & Muniesa, 2005) that 
enable actors to make decisions by evaluating the properties of the goods to be exchanged 
(Çalişkan & Callon, 2010; Callon, 1998). 
Central to this stream of studies is the analysis of calculative agencies, devices and tools 
that contribute to revealing, materializing and making calculable the properties of goods or 
service so that actors can exchange them on markets (Callon & Muniesa, 2005: 1231; Power, 
2004).  Beunza and Garud (2007), for instance, highlight the challenges of securities analysts, 
who had to search for metrics to value new business models before the ‘.com bubble’; 
MacKenzie and Millo (2003) have documented the major role played by calculative devices 
embedded in the ‘Black-Sholes formula’ in the constitution of a market for financial 
derivatives in Chicago; and Callon (2009) and MacKenzie (2009) show how calculability 
issues underlie the building of a market for ‘carbon trading’. 
Performativity studies of markets have been initially criticized for their lack of political 
anchors and the importance they attribute to the role played by economics in actual market 
making (see Holm & Nielseon, 2007; Miller, 2002; for a recent synthesis: Vosselman, 2014).  
However, several studies have highlighted the micro-political dynamics inherent to 
calculative devices, clarifying the connection between the performativity studies of markets 
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and the ‘government of economic life’ thesis (Miller, 1992; Miller & Rose, 1990), according 
to which calculative activities should be regarded as related to broader power dynamics 
(Miller & Power, 2013; Vollmer, Mennicken & Preda, 2009).  For instance, Van 
Hoyweghen’s (2014) analysis of the life insurance market shows that mundane calculative 
devices used by insurers and medical agencies in their daily activities contribute to the 
production of ‘political effects’, notably by producing and reproducing inequalities.  In the 
domain of SRI, Déjean, Gond and Leca (2004) have mobilized Callon (1998) together with a 
Foucauldian view on power to highlight how calculative devices within the SRI market 
produce ‘systemic power’, while Chelli and Gendron (2013) show how sustainability ratings 
promote an ‘ideology of numbers’ in the SRI market that sustains various forms of 
‘disciplinary power’ (Foucault, 1978, 1979). 
Even though these developments have confirmed the relevancy of combining a political / 
power approach to market making that includes insights from the performative / calculative 
perspective on markets, we argue that they remain limited by their univocal conceptualization 
of power as ‘subjectification’ (Fleming & Spicer, 2007) – derived from Foucault’s concepts 
of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1979) and ‘discipline’ (Foucault, 1978) – and their corollary 
neglect of other facets of power that may be involved in the process of market making 
through calculability.  In so doing, these works do not yet fully explore how macro political 
dynamics interface with the micro political effects documented by studies of markets as 
‘collective calculative devices’.  We now turn to an alternative approach to power to 
reconsider how calculability and power interact in the process of market construction. 
Beyond Subjectification: Reconsidering Power and Its Links to 
Calculability  
Central to our argument is Lukes’ (2005) critical reconsideration of the concept of power as 
‘subjectification’, which is inherent to the Foucauldian notions of ‘governmentality’ and 
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‘discipline’ (see Foucault, 1978, 1979) that have to date informed most analyses of how 
calculability and power interact through market making.  According to Fleming and Spicer, 
‘power as subjectification’ can be described as follows: 
Here, the focus is not on decision-making or non-decision making, or the ideological 
suppression of conflict, but the constitution of the very person who makes decisions. 
According to [Michel] Foucault, power is achieved through defining the conditions of 
possibility underlying how we experience ourselves as people. Power, therefore, produces 
the kind of people we feel we naturally are. (Fleming & Spicer, 2007, p. 23) 
For Lukes (2005), Foucault’s approach to power as ‘subjectification’ is ‘ultra-radical’, 
and the accounts Foucault provided are too ideal-typical to grasp through actual analyses of 
empirical processes of how power plays out and, in particular, of whether and how power has 
either succeeded or failed (p. 98).  Lukes (2005: 99-107) reserves his fiercest critiques to 
Foucault-inspired works that have analysed how ‘subjects are constituted by power’ because 
these works are ‘de-facing’ power.  According to Lukes (2005), in adopting such a broad, 
fluid and subjectivist understanding of power, Foucauldian scholars buy into a subversive 
reconsideration of freedom that makes power and its effects so pervasive that ‘it no longer 
makes sense to speak … of the very possibility of people being more or less free from others’ 
power to live as their own nature and judgement dictate’ (p. 107). 
In contrast with Foucault’s subjectivist and ‘ultra-radical view on power’, Lukes (2005) 
argues that power is ‘real and effective’, even though it may operate through ‘hidden’ and 
‘indirect’ means (p. 64).  Lukes’ (2005) alternative approach to power is known as the 
‘radical’ or ‘three-dimensional’ view and derives from the basic notion ‘that A exercises 
power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests’ (p. 37).  Yet, Lukes 
(2005) expands considerably this liminal definition to integrate the consideration of 
observable uses of power as expressed through coercion by controlling uncertainty or access 
to resources (Dahl, 1957; Pfeffer, 1981). Further, he considers the more covert or subtle 
processes of manipulation, consisting for instance of ‘setting agendas’ or ‘mobilizing actors’ 
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biases’ (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970) to maintain the status quo or to impose the views desired 
by powerful actors by presenting them as unavoidable or desirable, a process referred to as 
domination in the literature on power (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006; Courpasson, 
2000; Fleming & Spicer, 2007, 2014). 
We contend that Lukes’ (2005) approach to power as encompassing facets related to 
coercion, manipulation and domination usefully complements studies focused on ‘power as 
subjectification’ to empirically document the calculative-power nexus in the process of 
market construction for two reasons.  First, calculative agencies not only ‘constitute subjects 
and subjectivities’ (Miller, 1992; Miller & Rose, 1991) but can also engage in coercion or 
manipulation on their own and can be actively mobilized through other actors’ power games.  
By considering calculative agencies as potential ‘sites of power’ but also as ‘autonomous 
market organizations’ (Ahrne et al., 2015) with their own agendas and interests, we can 
deepen the prior subjectification views on calculability by analysing how power plays 
through, over and also against calculative agencies in a process of market construction.  
Second, in calling to give a ‘face’ to power by identifying ‘who’ and/or ‘what’ actually 
exercises power over ‘whom’ and/or ‘what’ and determining whether uses of power 
succeeded or failed, Lukes’ (2005) approach to power can elucidate how the micro politics of 
calculability is related to the macro-political processes of market construction. 
To analytically document how the multiple facets of power play out in a process of 
market construction, we consider the multiple sites from which power can be exercised in 
relation to calculative agencies, in line with Fleming and Spicer (2014).  Power occurs 
through organizations when ‘an organization as a whole becomes a vehicle or agent to further 
certain political interests and goals’ (Fleming & Spicer, 2014: 246), and calculative agencies 
can certainly serve higher level political interests, potentially despite their own will and even 
without their own knowledge.  Power can also play over organizations as ‘the way in which 
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elites might compete to influence the objectives, strategies, and makeup of the organization’s 
goals’ (Fleming & Spicer, 2014: 246), for instance, by redefining the calculative practices or 
the governance structure of a calculative agency.  Finally, power can play against agency 
when ‘extra-organizational spaces’ are used ‘to engage in political struggles in order to target 
organizational activity’ (Fleming & Spicer, 2014: 246-247):  calculative practices and their 
outcomes such as numbers, ratings and rankings can indeed be contested from outside, as the 
legitimacy of a calculative agency can be drastically reconsidered.  
Our approach to power allows the relationships between calculability and power to be 
explored while recognizing that calculative agencies can produce ‘forms of power’ and 
‘political effects’ through their activities.  In addition, it also makes it possible to consider the 
emergent and unintended effects of calculative activities such as disruption and changes in 
market order, which have often been neglected by both political and calculative analyses of 
markets (Overdevest, 2011), and to consider the capture or remobilization of these effects by 
actors to alter the dynamics of market construction. 
In sum, to complement prior studies of how power and calculability interface and to 
elucidate how the ‘changing geopolitics of calculative power’ (Callon & Muniesa, 2005) is 
related to the construction of ‘markets as politics’ (Fligstein, 1991, 2001), we propose 
empirically exploring how multiple facets of power – beyond ‘subjectification’ (Foucault, 
1978, 1979) – are engaged by, through, over and against calculative agencies in the 
construction of a market.  To do so, we focus on the case of SRI in France. 
Context, Method and Data 
Research Context: Socially Responsible Investment in France 
SRI can be broadly defined as a set of investment practices (Kurtz, 2008) that aim at 
considering extra-financial criteria ‘in decisions over whether to acquire, hold or dispose of a 
particular investment’ (Cowton 1999: 60). These extra-financial criteria can relate to 
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environmental, social, ethical or governance considerations (Eurosif, 2014).  Empirically, SRI 
can be regarded as an ‘organizational field’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) that encompasses a 
broad range of actors who wish to use financial markets for the purpose of enhancing 
corporate responsibility (e.g., NGOs, environmentalists) and/or to develop products, services 
and other market activities related to SRI (Arjaliès, 2010; Déjean, Gond & Leca, 2004; Slager 
et al., 2012; Vogel, 2005). 
The French SRI market is an ideal case for our inquiry (Yin, 2009) because it presents the 
characteristic of being subjected to both political and calculative dynamics.  On the political 
side, developing this market involves making ‘space’ for a new category of products in the 
asset management marketplace or directly engaging with dominant financial actors such as 
institutional investors.  In Europe, SRI market construction also relates to political issues such 
as the management of pension funds or employee savings funds (Eurosif, 2014; Jurvale & 
Lewis, 2009), and prior studies have shown the importance of voting for new regulations in 
the specific case of France (Crifo & Motis, 2013; Déjean, 2005; Giamporcaro, 2006).  On the 
calculative side, designing SRI products involves evaluating whether stocks are ‘socially 
responsible’ (Acquier & Aggieri, 2007), an activity that indicates the uncertainties 
surrounding the measurement of CSR (Chatterji, Durand, Levine & Touboul, 2015; Gond & 
Crane, 2010).  Prior works have confirmed the central role of calculative agencies in the 
emergence of the French SRI market (Arjaliès, 2010; Déjean et al., 2004; Gond, 2006). 
According to the 2010 US SIF ‘Trends Report’, professionally managed assets following 
SRI strategies stood at $3.07 trillion at the start of 2010, a rise of more than 380% over the 
1995 figure of $639 billion, the year of the first such report (SIF, 2010).  This growth meant 
that by the end of 2010, nearly one out of every eight dollars under professional management 
in the US was involved in some type of SRI strategy.  Meanwhile, the European SRI market – 
as ‘broadly defined’ by Eurosif – increased from €2.7 trillion in 2007 to €5 trillion at the end 
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of 2009 to €6.7 trillion by the end of 2011 (Eurosif, 2012, p. 63) and to €9,8 trillion by the 
end of 2013 (Eurosif, 2014, p. 21), at which point France was one of Europe’s leading SRI 
markets (along with the UK and the Netherlands), with a size of €1.8 trillion (Eurosif, 2012, 
p. 63).  
In France, between the early 1980s and 1997, only 7 asset management companies 
commercialized a few SRI fund products, representing a couple of million Euros; by 2003, 
these figures had grown to 48 asset management companies supplying 108 SRI fund products 
representing €4.4 billion (Novethic, 2003).  The market ‘take off’ coincided with the creation 
of the first agency to offer tools for evaluating CSR (Déjean et al., 2004) – by December 
2007, the French SRI market featured 175 products and amounted to €20 billion (Novethic, 
2007).  As we shall see in the empirical analysis, the role of calculability in this market ‘take 
off’ did not mean that political games were absent from its emergence.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
evolution of the French SRI market between 1998 and 2012 – our empirical analysis focuses 
on the period between 1997 and 2008, during which the interactions between calculative 
agencies and power dynamics were the most obvious. 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
Data Collection 
Our study combines data from multiple sources to document the emergence and development 
of the French SRI market and to examine the links between power and calculability. 
Participatory observations 
One of this paper’s authors was employed as a researcher for one of the organizations 
involved in the emerging French SRI market, observing and documenting its development 
over five years while completing her PhD.  Her main mission was to assess the market’s 
various developments, notably by organizing surveys that were sent to asset managers or 
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extra-financial rating agencies but also by meeting the market’s key actors to document the 
primary events and changes in its development.  This author was responsible for producing 
much of the quantified information used in this study to evaluate the SRI market’s 
development, most of which was specifically made accessible to us for the purpose of this 
research. 
This author used the centrality of her organization in the French SRI field to conduct a 
detailed ethnography of both the organization and the entire French SRI field.  Beyond the 
quantified information she collected and compiled, she took weekly notes about the various 
meetings, workshops, and conferences she attended and her face-to-face, e-mail and phone 
interactions with various extra-financial information providers, asset owners and managers, 
and other organizations involved in the calculability of SRI in France during this period.  This 
privileged position allowed her to observe the power dynamics that have structured the 
development of the French SRI industry’s history ‘from the inside’. 
Interviews 
‘In-vivo’ observations of the market in the participatory observation context were achieved 
via a set of 51 in-depth interviews with individuals working for extra-financial information 
providers, asset management companies or corporate managers in charge of creating and 
administering the calculative and judgement devices produced by the SRI industry.  Some 
interviews (25) were conducted ‘in-vivo’ during her participatory observation period, and the 
other 26 were conducted retrospectively (to account for the SRI market’s historical 
emergence):  both types aimed to deepen our understanding of the SRI industry’s calculative 
practices. 
A first set of 12 interviews focused on social rating agencies – and in particular on Arese 
(now Vigeo), the company that pioneered this activity in France and that is known for its key 
role in the French SRI industry’s emergence (Arjaliès, 2010; Déjean et al., 2004).  Most (27) 
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interviews were conducted with asset managers engaged in SRI to gather information about 
the construction and utilization of calculative devices in the SRI context.  Finally, 12 
interviews were conducted with the actors in charge of providing corporate information to 
SRI agencies or with managers of organizations that were less central to the French SRI field 
to obtain a broader picture of their perceptions of market calculability issues.  All the 
interviews (which are listed and dated in Appendix A) were conducted in French (all of the 
interviewees were French or fluent French speakers) and all but two were conducted between 
2000 and 2008.  The interviews were taped and transcribed for analysis – in all, they yielded 
more than 60 hours of data. 
Other data sources 
We complemented our primary data sources with two types of secondary sources.  First, we 
collected newspaper articles systematically via the Nexis database by using the names of 
calculative agencies (e.g., Vigeo, Innovest, CIES, Novethic, FRR, ERAFP) as key words or 
by searching via general SRI-related terms.  These searches allowed us to build an extensive 
database of articles addressing the SRI French market that was used to reconstruct the key 
events that structured that market.  (An extract of this database is provided as Appendix B.) 
Second, we used the quantitative information collected by the first author to identify the 
key market shifts in terms of calculability and SRI practices.  These data allowed us, for 
instance, to document on a quarterly basis the number of analysts working for each asset 
manager between 2000 and 2012, whether the asset managers used one or several CSR 
information providers, the levels of SRI assets under management and the main market actors.  
Other relevant secondary data sources for this research were the guides produced by the 
ORSE (Observatoire Français de la Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises) in 2004, 2005 
and 2012, which provided detailed information on extra-financial information providers as 
well as monographs, articles or books focused either totally or partly on the history of SRI in 
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France (Arjaliès, 2010; Déjean, 2005; Giamporcaro, 2006; Gond, 2006; Pénalva-Icher, 2007). 
Data analysis 
We used several longitudinal data analysis techniques to ‘make sense’ of our rich data 
(Langley, 1999) and to build an account of how calculability and power interacted in the 
French SRI market.  First, we built a chronology of the key events that structured the French 
SRI market’s development.  This information, together with prior accounts of the market’s 
history (e.g., Arjaliès, 2010; Déjean, 2005) allowed us to identify the most significant market 
development periods and from this, to define a ‘temporal bracketing’ (Langley, 1999) of three 
periods that were homogeneous in terms of dominant actors and structure:  a first period of 
‘market emergence’ from 1997 to 2002, which was dominated by one centralized information 
provider (Arese) and which saw the emergence of CSR calculative devices that made the 
creation of SRI products by a few SRI asset managers possible; a second period 
corresponding to a period of ‘market consolidation’ (from 2002 to 2005) that stemmed from 
legislation (passed in 2001 and 2002) supporting the development of the market and was 
characterized by the intense activity of labour unions as well as the increase in and 
stabilization of the number of CSR calculative devices, SRI products and SRI asset managers; 
and a third period of ‘market mainstreaming’ (2006 to 2008), during which large public 
institutional investors came onto the market, considerably expanding the size of the SRI assets 
under management. Our quantitative data supported this time bracketing, and the beginning of 
each period corresponds to an inflexion point in the curves in Figure 1.  Table I provides 
quantified indicators that illustrate the development of the market from 2003 to 2011. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES I ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
To identify the various facets of power mobilized by actors, we proceeded in two steps. 
We first built a narrative of the history of the French SRI market from 1997 to 2008 based on 
our secondary data to identify the plausible uses of power by each macro actor and/or 
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calculative agency over the three phases of market development.  Then, we conducted a 
content analysis of our interviews (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and internal observations, relying 
on the typology of facets of power proposed by Lukes (2005) and including coercion, 
manipulation and domination.  Although coercion is an easily observable form of power in 
which some actors have clearly opposed interests, our interviews and primary observations 
provided us with precious insights about subtler approaches to manipulation and domination 
that we could hardly have qualified as such.  Moving back and forth between interviewees’ 
insights, our initial narrative, and Lukes’ (2005) concept, we documented how macro actors 
or calculative agencies engaged in forms of coercion, manipulation or domination, either 
over, through, or against other actors.  It emerged from this analysis that the forces from the 
macro-social context usually played a key role in the design and transformation of calculative 
agencies, whereas calculative agencies themselves engaged permanently in micro-power 
moves to consolidate their position. 
At a final stage, we reorganized our findings to build a narrative account of the market’s 
development through the three periods that recognizes the central role of macro actors yet 
highlights how calculative agencies are involved directly or indirectly in these actors’ 
attempts to shape market building.  This narrative constitutes the core of our findings section. 
Calculability as Politics in the Construction of the French SRI Market 
Market Emergence (1997-2002) 
The Macro Context Driving SRI Market Emergence 
Newspaper articles mentioning SRI in the mid-1990s usually discuss this notion in relation to 
two important economic and political debates of the time:  the future of the financial 
management of employee savings and the reform of the French pension scheme.  The 
traditional ‘pay-as-you-go’ French pension system was then seen as threatened by 
demographic trends such as an ageing population.  The possibility of relying more extensively 
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on financial markets to address these issues triggered numerous debates.  Interestingly, both 
issues involved the French government, labour unions, and a central public French financial 
institution: the Caisse des Dépots and Consignation (CDC) (literally: the Deposits and 
Consignments Funds), which operates under the control of the French parliament and whose 
CEO is nominated by the French President. 
Since the early 1990s, executives from the CDC had been exploring the conditions under 
which ‘pension funds’ could become a reality in a French political environment within which 
leftist labour unions are traditionally ideologically opposed to the management of retirement 
money through financial markets (I.41, I.48).i  Executives from the CDC ordered studies 
about the functioning of foreign pension funds.  One of these studies, focused on the 
development and governance of US pension funds, was supplied by Genevieve Férone, a 
French executive who was then working at KHN, a small consultancy based in California 
(I.45, I.46).  As a follow-up consultancy service, Férone organized a business trip for her 
executive clients from the CDC and the Caisses d’Épargne (CÉ), another important French 
banking institution rooted in the cooperative-banking movement.  According to interviewees 
who organized or were involved in this trip, at this time, French executives from the CÉ and 
CDC became acquainted with the US concept of SRI, as Férone invited members from 
leading US organizations from the SRI scene, such as managers from the California pension 
fund CalPERS.  The French executives from CÉ and CDC envisioned SRI as a promising idea 
able to conciliate a pension fund management approach based on financial markets with the 
notion of ‘public service’ or ‘social progress’ important for cooperative banks and left-wing 
French labour unions.  Although SRI was not regarded as a strategic priority by the CEOs of 
these banks at the time (I.1, I.41, I.48), both CÉ and CDC had vested interest in promoting a 
concept that demonstrated the potential to use the financial markets to promote the social 
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good in order to maintain their central position in any future reform of employee savings and 
pension funds. 
Making Space for SRI; Creating a Calculative Agency 
Despite the interests at stake, the constitution of a space for SRI in the French financial 
marketplace only indirectly and loosely involved two of the CÉ and CDC ‘macro actors’ and 
relates mainly to the design of a calculative agency, which enabled the development of SRI 
products by making ‘CSR calculable’ (Callon, 1998; Déjean et al., 2004).  Leveraging her 
contacts at CDC and CÉ after the business trip, Férone obtained from them a consultancy 
mandate to study the feasibility of developing SRI funds by providing information about CSR 
for stock rated French corporations.  Despite the disappointing outcome of this first market 
study – according to which French investors were not yet ready to accept the notion of SRI – 
she managed to convince her CDC and CÉ contacts to financially support the development of 
a startup focused on the quantification of CSR information, which in 1997 would officially 
become ‘Arese’, the first French social rating agency.  The novelty of this organization is 
reflected in the newspapers’ accounts of Arese at the time: 
A social evaluation for corporations?  The idea, inspired from systems of financial ratings 
provided by agencies, may seem surprising.  Have we ever seen financial markets taking 
social and ecological criteria into account?  Could you imagine Rhône-Poulenc, Essilor, 
Lafarge-Coppée, Danone, Laboratoire Guerbet or Accor being gauged through twenty 
ethical criteria … A revolution!  This project became a reality under the name of Arese 
(for Analysis, Research and Social study on Enterprises) which has favourably evaluated’ 
six corporations. (La Tribune, 30/05/97) 
The power imbalance between the small team of fresh young professionals hired by 
Férone at Arese and the most powerful French multinational corporations was taken up by 
most newspapers’ reports.  This ‘David vs. Goliath’ context suggested that the corporate side 
could potentially resist ratings through moves ‘against’ the calculative agency, even though 
its two shareholders, the CDC and the CÉ, were, as explained by insider interviewees, seen as 
‘institutional mammoths’ (I.6) in the French financial marketplace.  And yet, all of the 
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insiders we interviewed suggest that only one of the French MNCs from the CAC 40 did not 
spontaneously comply with the rating game and aimed to destabilize the agency by criticizing 
its method in public forums (I.2, I.8, I.12). ii  Other informants suggested that this corporation 
also directly lobbied Arese’s shareholders to obtain a revision of its CSR ratings — although 
unsuccessfully, according to Férone and some analysts (Férone, interview, 2002, I.1; Arese 
analysts I.2, I.7, I.8). 
In contrast with such attempts to coerce the calculative agency, most other rated French 
corporations accepted the principle of an external rating, and some of them even invited the 
‘CSR analysts’ on-site to provide them with extra information (I.42, I.44).  A former analyst 
of Arese summarized when reflecting on this early period:  ‘Arese was about to obtain ‘what 
Anglo-Saxon called the right to rate [in English in the French quote].  This is essential … and 
this is also permanent work’ (Arese analyst, I.2). 
Some corporations even used the Arese questionnaires to start designing their internal 
process for CSR reporting (Head of CSR/SD, Bank Company, I.43).  The creation of these 
corporate relationships enhanced the position of Arese by consolidating its access to primary 
qualitative and quantitative information that was not necessarily already available.  
Interestingly, most of the largest CAC 40 French corporations assessed by Arese mentioned 
information about their Arese ratings in their external communications to demonstrate the 
soundness of their CSR policy initiatives, establishing Arese as, effectively, the calculative 
standard for evaluating CSR (Déjean, 2005; Gond, 2006).  By 2002, this calculative agency, 
which did not count more than a dozen analysts, was indirectly shaping how some of the 
biggest French listed corporations communicated their CSR progress. 
The lack of resistance on the corporate side against this ‘calculative practice’ imposed 
from the outside confirmed prior insights into the acceptability of quantification and 
calculated ratings as ‘technology of government’ (Miller & Rose, 1991; Miller, 1992).  The 
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dominance of an ‘ideology of numbers’ (Chelli & Gendron, 2011) certainly contributed to 
defuse early corporate attempts to mobilize manipulation or coercion against Arese.  
However, a closer analysis of Arese’s activities suggests that this CSR calculative agency also 
gained ‘regulative power’ (Slager et al., 2012) through the connection between its rating 
system and internal and external reporting systems at French corporations and, further, that it 
had influence over the calculative practices internally developed by asset managers to develop 
SRI products. 
In filling the calculative void that prevented asset managers at French banks from 
developing SRI products due to uncertainty related to identifying ‘socially responsible’ stocks 
(Acquier & Aggeri, 2007), Arese both supported the development of new SRI products and 
generated asymmetric calculative capacities among actors in the financial market.  On the one 
hand, Arese started to build some privileged ties with a few pioneering French asset managers 
who were the first to agree to pay for this very new CSR rating service. 
It was interesting to meet ARESE CSR analysts at the very beginning because they were 
happy to meet with us and to really understand how we were going to use their work.  It 
was easy because it was a bunch of young people and it seemed that we were 
constructing the methodology together instead of being in a simple client-provider 
relationship.  (French Asset Manager, interview, 2002, I.24) 
The result of Arese’s calculative activity was a set of quantified scores that could be 
easily integrated by these pioneering asset managers who wanted to engage in SRI, as they 
covered, at first, the key French financial indices (CAC 40 and later SBF 120) and later the 
key European indices (Férone, interview, 2002, I.1). 
Arese, created in 1997, has managed to convince six financial institutions to launch 
themselves on the ‘ethical’ adventure.  Among the first investment funds launched were:  
Eurosocietal from ABF, in partnership with BNP Entreprises, in May 1999, the MACIF 
sustainable growth fund in October 1999, 1,2,3 Future’ from the Caisse D’Epargne at the 
end of the month.  “An interest has nowadays emerged at the biggest financial institutions 
and in a few retail banks,” added Geneviève Férone. (Le Monde 27/10/1999) 
On the other hand, as described by Déjean (2005), the relationship between Arese and 
asset managers increasingly took the shape of a ‘delegation’ process, which suggests a 
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successful ‘black-boxing’ of the calculative device (Latour, 1987):  that is, the task of 
evaluating CSR was generally delegated to Arese, creating a form of dependency on the side 
of asset managers.  This calculative asymmetry influenced how SRI funds were constructed 
and resulted in a sharp increase in the number of asset management companies from 1997 to 
2002 from 7 to 48 (see Table I and Figure 1). 
Thanks to this tool, which has been able, in sum, to make quantitative what was 
previously qualitative, more and more French [asset] managers set off on the big 
adventure of ethical funds. (Les Échos 03/12/1999) 
Geneviève Férone and her team were also quite skilled in using print media to strengthen 
her firm’s reputation.  Arese was the subject of over 200 newspaper articles in the mainstream 
French media during this period (Gond, 2006). 
Calculative Infrastructure Centralization and Legal Consolidation 
The micro level constitution of the power of Arese and of its power over other calculative 
agencies (e.g., asset managers, CSR managers at corporations) largely benefited from the 
loose yet ‘symbolically loaded’ support of two powerful macro actors (CÉ and CDC) that 
were interested promoting a concept that could serve their vested interests regarding macro 
issues of the time (Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013; Zarlowski, 2007).  In parallel, the CÉ and 
CDC together with other macro actors were instrumental in lobbying the left-wing 
government to shape the legal framework of state-owned pension funds and employee 
savings.  They enrolled the new calculative agency in a variety of ways in this process.  For 
instance, Férone was consulted as an expert during the political debates and ministerial 
workshops focused on the integration of SRI within the French investment industry.  Arese 
also worked directly for the CDC to generate strategic positions that could be integrated in the 
future set of laws. 
The ultimate outcomes of these political debates were the Loi Fabius (Laws 2001-152 
and 2001-624) and the Loi sur les Nouvelles Régulations Economiques (the so-called NRE 
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law).  Law 2001-152 enacted on 19 February 2001 required investors in charge of employee 
saving schemes to disclose how they took ethical, social and environmental information into 
account in their investment decisions and in their exercise of shareholder rights.  Law 2001-
624 created the Fonds de Réserve des Retraites (pension reserve fund) or ‘FRR’, a public 
retirement buffer fund created to prevent any liquidity default in the ‘pay as you go’ French 
retirement system fund on the financial markets; the promoters of this fund were again 
required to take CSR concerns into account in their fund investment decisions (Giamporcaro, 
2006).  On the other hand, Law NRE consolidated the ‘calculative infrastructure’ of the SRI 
market by making mandatory the disclosure of information about social and environmental 
management policies in the financial statements of all stock rated corporations from 2002 on. 
Power Moves and Calculability in Period 1 
In starting to build a ‘calculative infrastructure’ for assessing CSR, the calculative agency 
launched by Férone established the principle of a ‘CSR rating’ and demonstrated the potential 
for asset managers to build SRI products related to these ratings – two necessary conditions to 
‘perform into being’ the SRI market.  These ratings could then benefit from the effect of 
subjectification, an ‘ideology of numbers’, which is indeed pregnant within the French 
financial marketplace; however, they first had to be designed to make SRI products, and our 
analysis suggests that other forms of power were mobilized. 
In relation to power moves, we observed that a domination attempt succeeded when the 
power of two macro actors (CDC, CÉ) was played through calculative agencies either by 
supporting the development of the first rating agency to establish the principle of CSR rating 
and make the design of SRI products possible or by mobilizing this agency’s experts to help 
design laws consolidating the nascent CSR calculative infrastructure.  The Arese calculative 
agency became, through this process and via loose macro and intense micro ‘manipulation 
power games’, a site of power of its own, positioned as an ‘obligatory passage point’ (Callon, 
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1986; Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 2006).  Through the connection and the ‘calculative 
asymmetries’ it established across the calculative practice of French corporations from the 
CAC 40, Arese coerced and gained power over other calculative agencies (e.g., asset 
managers who depended on its ratings).  An attempt from one French MNC to resist the 
coercive CSR rating exercise — a form of power against its nascent calculative practices — 
arose but appears to have failed according to our findings. 
Period 2 – Market Consolidation (2002-2005) 
Macro Context: Recapturing the Calculative Sites of Power 
Starting in 2002, the regulatory transformation led by the Fabius Law convinced some trade 
union representatives to engage within the SRI market to keep their influence a part of the 
management and re-designing of employee savings and employee retirement plans.  Major 
figures in labour unions, reflecting a diversity of political orientations, led this movement 
with the aim of either opposing, or benefitting from, the development of SRI.  Central to their 
moves was the control of the site of power constituted by the new calculative agency. 
A striking occurrence of such a top-down move aiming to recapture calculative capacities 
is highlighted by the highly mediatized fight between the head of Arese, Geneviève Férone, 
and Nicole Notat, the newly retired head of the CFDT (Confederation French Democratic 
Confederation of Labour), which was at the time the leading French trade union in terms of 
numbers of affiliates.  As the head of CFDT, Notat had been closely involved in the 
governance of social security institutions and in a number of labour negotiations (Zarlowski, 
2007: 174).  She was also criticized by other trade unions for her reformist stance and in 
particular for her support of retirement reform.  At the end of 2002, the ex-CFDT leader 
announced her intention to create a ‘new’ audit-based CSR rating agency.  This 
announcement was swiftly followed by the announcement that Arese’s shareholders and, at 
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their head, the CDC agreed to merge the company with Nicole Notat’s project, giving birth to 
Vigeo (Le Monde, 26/08/02; Le Monde, 11/12/02). 
Nicole Notat not only convinced the former champions of Arese at the CDC and the CÉ 
to support her project.  She also mobilized her close relationships with some former French 
grand patrons (top CEOs) and prominent political elites to enrol numerous French listed 
companies, the main French asset managers and trade unions in the Vigeo project by adopting 
a multipartite ownership structure to support her new agency.  This move reflects an 
interesting repositioning of the calculative agency within the network of relationships, which 
literally ‘bound together’ multiple powerful macro actors around the Vigeo project.  Once at 
the head of Vigeo, Notat imposed, in addition to the ‘declarative CSR rating’ for investors’ 
use already conducted by Arese, a second business offering—an ‘audit-based rating’ that 
companies would pay for and that could provide them with a diagnostic tool to measure their 
CSR performance. 
While this new business model was purposively designed to generate new streams of 
revenue for the agency and to align the interest of French corporations and asset managers to 
those Vigeo, its new governance structured ‘backfired’ in the media.  Critiques of Vigeo were 
fuelled by Férone, consultants and academics, who denunciated the agency’s independence 
and objectivity – some French corporations could be simultaneously shareholders and 
customers of Vigeo services while being rated ‘independently’ by the same agency – and the 
risk of Vigeo’s hegemonic domination plan for the SRI market: 
‘A corporation has no “honest” reason for putting money in a social rating agency’ 
according to Pascal d’Humières, director of the consultancy Ecodurable. (Le Monde 
14/01/03) 
Micro Dynamics of Calculative Agencies’ Competition 
Although Vigeo consolidated the former position of Arese by taking over most of its CSR 
analyst team and all of its client base (Le Monde, 06/11/03), several factors boosted the 
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competition for calculating CSR, creating a more competitive and diversified ‘market for 
CSR information’ (La Tribune, 11/03/03) that was similar to other ‘moral markets’ such as 
Fair Trade (Reinecke et al., 2012).  First, Vigeo entered into an intense recruitment phase to 
strengthen its CSR analyst team and its calculative agency (I.12).  Second, Arese’s former 
CEO joined the mainstream financial rating firm Fitch and created a competing agency with 
some faithful ex-Arese CSR analysts: CoreRating (I.10).  Third, European and American CSR 
information providers also stepped in, attracted by the passing of the employee savings and 
retirement plan laws, which signalled the likely development of the French SRI market (I.10). 
As a result, even though Vigeo remained the most used CSR rating agency on the French 
market from 2003 to 2005 (with a steady 46% to 47% market share), the competition 
reshaped the calculative asymmetries between CSR rating agencies and asset managers as 
well as among rating agencies, altering Vigeo’s power position.  Asset managers started to 
diversify their sources of CSR information, so that 29% of asset managers used 2 or more 
CSR rating agencies in 2003, but this figure increased to 39% in 2004 (see Table I). 
BNP PAM is strengthening its SRI management capacities and yesterday announced a 
partnership with two social rating agencies:  Deminor (focused on Corporate 
Governance) and Innovest (focused on respect for the Environment).  These agreements 
complement a prior partnership with Vigeo. (La Tribune, 24/01/03) 
Multiplying the source of CSR information and hence redistributing calculative capacities 
within asset management firms was made possible by the multiplication of CSR calculative 
agencies.  This calculative micro-level trend related to competitive dynamics and was 
simultaneously reinforced by the domination strategies of French labour unions and the 
creation of a new calculative agency: Novethic, a subsidiary of the CDC. 
Macro and Micro Actors Attempt to Take Control over Calculative Agencies 
In 2002, four French labour unions (CFDT, CFTC, CGC and CGT) agreed to form the Comité 
Intersyndical pour l’Épargne Salariale (or CIES), which literally means the “inter-union 
committee for employee savings”.  The CIES aimed to help labour unions take the lead on the 
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financial management of employee savings.  The CIES decided to create a label that would 
guarantee, among other things, the ‘social quality’ of employee savings investment products.  
Although the possibility for French labour unions to create a label ‘theoretically’ existed in 
the legal framework regulating unions since 1945, it had rarely if ever been used in the past 
(Déjean, 2005).  Labour unions strategically mobilized this label to establish their power over 
the management of employee savings: only asset managers whose investment products were 
awarded the CIES label would henceforth be allowed to manage employee savings (Déjean, 
2005, La Tribune, 10/04/02). 
The CIES organized several rounds of SRI fund evaluation and rejected almost all of the 
first round applications from asset managers to obtain a CIES label because the managers 
lacked internal calculative capacities or relied on a single rating agency. 
In practice, trade unions have preferred employee saving funds whose asset managers had 
internal SRI capacities and therefore do not rely only on external CSR rating agencies. 
(Le Monde, 02/06/03) 
This is not enough to buy the information of only one social rating agency.  An asset 
manager must possess several sources of CSR information and internal analysis 
capacities, which means that asset managers need to recruit SRI analysts. (CGT, Analyse 
et Documents Economiques, 97, 2004) 
Thus, from 2002 onwards, asset managers became aware that to obtain the label and 
potentially benefit from the employee savings market driven by the Fabius law, they had to 
provide evidence that they had developed internal CSR calculability capacities and used 
diversified sources of CSR information.  This strategy by CIES to control employee savings 
money management rebalanced calculative asymmetries between asset managers and CSR 
rating agencies to the benefit of the former. 
Another interesting attempt to take the lead over calculative agencies during the same 
period emerged not from macro actors but from the bottom through the initiative of another 
calculative agency: Novethic.  Novethic was created in late 2001 as a subsidiary of the CDC 
by one of its former employees, Jean-Pierre Sicard.  Because Novethic was asked by his CDC 
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shareholder to not compete directly with Vigeo around CSR ratings (I.50), the website and 
research centre was seeking an opportunity to create a unique calculative position in the SRI 
market.  In 2002, the managers found a concept that resonated: with the growth of SRI funds 
and a sizeable amount of money invested, new demands for SRI information would likely 
emerge from customers (e.g., how can customers be confident about the CSR quality of the 
SRI funds in which their money is invested?).  At this stage of the SRI market’s development, 
no regulatory standard existed to help define the quality of an ‘SRI fund’, which therefore 
remained invisible to the ultimate clients.  In addition, during this period, left-wing papers and 
radical watchdog organizations systematically described the SRI industry as ‘untrustworthy’ 
or ‘opaque’ (Le Monde Diplomatique, 2002; Politis, 2004; Que Choisir, 2003; TV show 24 
Heures, 2005). 
This context offered a unique opportunity to Novethic to position itself in the calculative 
chain and to exploit this void by designing a new online tool to enable final investors to 
evaluate the extra-financial quality of SRI funds.  The Novethic SRI rating for the social 
responsibility of SRI funds was targeted towards final investors based on free access on 
novethic.fr.  Similarly to Arese, Novethic had to confront some manipulation attempts from 
one prominent asset manager who initially refused to be rated and, after finally agreeing, then 
attempted to aggressively negotiate his rating results.  Despite this initial resistance and 
reluctance to be rated, Novethic, like Arese before, ultimately earned its ‘right to rate’ SRI 
funds, notably through the total transparency of its ratings methodology but also through its 
capacity to impose its SRI ratings through its own website and other press outlets.  
In France BNP PAM, unknown three years before in the SRI investment industry, created 
an SRI team composed of 4 analysts who spend all their time studying companies in 
terms of extra-financial criteria (social, environment, corporate governance).  This 
initiative seems to have brought success to BNP PAM, if you consider the very good 
ratings given by Novethic to its SRI funds. (Le Monde Argent, 13/12/04) 
A growing number of asset managers agreed to answer the questionnaire put together by 
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the small Novethic SRI rating team, to meet with the Novethic team and to develop ongoing 
conversations in relation to the yearly revision of the funds’ ratings.  Hence, despite the lack 
of interest from the final individual customers initially targeted by the Novethic rating it 
became established in the marketplace, as asset managers eventually came to use the rating 
system to analyse their own competitive environment and some even used the results from 
this judgement device on their advertising brochures. 
Power Moves and Calculability in Period 2 
In sum, the second period of SRI market construction shows how new forms of coercion, 
domination and manipulation were engaged in either by, over, or through calculative agencies 
with the aim of reshaping calculative asymmetries between agencies and hence transforming 
power relations.  On the one hand, Arese, once the central actor of the calculative 
infrastructure, was subjected to macro actors’ attempts for positions in the market, as 
illustrated by its taking over by Nicole Notat or the CIES attempts to take the lead on the 
financial management of employee savings through controlling the calculative practices of 
asset managers.  On the other hand, the micro-level dynamics of the interactions between 
calculative agencies fuelled power-dynamics.  First, the competition among CSR rating 
agencies distributed calculative capacities among multiple agencies and transformed the 
calculative asymmetries between asset managers and calculative agencies to the benefit of the 
former.  Second, by addressing calculative asymmetries between SRI asset managers and final 
customers through the design of a new device focused on the social quality of ‘SRI funds’ 
rather than on ‘corporations’, Novethic positioned itself as a central and relatively influential 
actor in the SRI market space.  These power moves influenced in return the macro 
development of SRI: macro actors (e.g. French labour unions) with a vested interest in the 
existence or control of CSR and SRI calculative agencies asserted their domination in the 
shaping and consolidation of the SRI market. 
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Period 3 – Market Mainstreaming (2005-2008) 
Stabilizing Forces in the Macro Context  
Starting in 2005, the implications of the Fabius law shaped the market with the creation and 
launch of two new state-owned public funds within the SRI marketplace:  the FRR and the 
Établissement pour la Retraite Additionnelle de la Fonction Publique (ERAFP) (public-
service supplementary retirement pension body).  Although established by the French 
legislator in 2001, neither organization entered the SRI market before 2005.  The FRR’s 
executive board, chaired by the Chief Executive Officer of the CDC and the chairman of the 
FRR supervisory board (which included legislators, labour and management stakeholders, and 
representatives of the ministries), presented the FRR in the media as an opportunity to 
enhance ‘socially responsible’ types of investment (L’Agefi, 11/03/04; Figaro Economie 
12/03/04).  This positioning was aligned with the government’s political orientation around 
the Fabius Law.  The ‘SRI’ component of the legal framework defused potential resistance on 
the part of the most radically ‘anti-financial market’ labour unions (e.g., CGT) represented in 
the FRR’s supervisory board.  Again, SRI served to demonstrate that public investors could 
engage with financial markets without betraying ‘social’ ideals. 
The FRR is an inter-generational tool; it cannot be indifferent to SRI, which promotes a 
sustainable development for future generations. (Raoul Briet, FRR chairman of the FRR, 
interviewed by La Tribune, 28/06/2005) 
At the end of 2005, the second public state-owned fund, the ERAFP, publicly ‘converted’ 
to SRI (ERAFP press release, 06/12/2005).  Also created in 2001 by the French Retirement 
Law, the ERAFP can be considered to be the ‘first’ French state-owned pension fund; its 
remit was to capitalize the additional retirement contributions of France’s 4.5 million public 
servants on the financial markets.  Criticized by some trade unions as a ‘serious breach’ of the 
French ‘pay as you go’ retirement system (CGT 2004), the ERAFP executive directors 
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stressed that, from 2005, its full allegiance to inter-generational solidarity would be expressed 
via its commitment to SRI: 
We have made the choice to invest only in SRI because we think that this approach is 
aligned with our Common Interest duty and corresponds to our public service vocation. 
(Phillipe Caila ERAPF director interviewed by La Tribune 04/07/2006) 
Meanwhile, the entry of these major players was creating excitement within the SRI market:  
In the small French field of SRI, there is hope that the FRR commitment is going to boost 
SRI investing.  Up until now, only a few institutional investors have been converted. (Le 
Monde 29/06/2005) 
The SRI activities of the FRR and ERAFP and of a few institutional investors had a 
massive impact on the SRI market’s development from 2005 to 2008: the total amount of SRI 
assets managed in France increased from 10 billion to 20 billion (see Figure 1 and Table I).  A 
long-lasting ‘institutional market’ for SRI in France was now becoming established, and its 
main promoters started engaging with the calculative agencies.  
New Macro Actors’ Reorganization of Calculative Capacities 
In June 2005, the FRR, located within the CDC offices, launched a much awaited SRI ‘call 
for tender’ for €600 million.  To prepare for this event, the FRR consulted a wide range of 
CSR and SRI calculative agencies but very quickly asserted its willingness to lead the future 
of SRI in France through its influence over and through calculative agencies: 
We need to play a pioneering role on some subjects. Our SRI call for tender can bring a 
methodological contribution to the development of the SRI market and its actors: asset 
managers and CSR rating agencies. (Raoul Briet, FRR chairman interviewed by La 
Tribune, 28/06/2005) 
More than 40 local and foreign asset managers answered the first FRR call, and when it 
unveiled the list of 6 winners in May 2006, only one French asset manager (AGF Asset 
Management) was selected among a list of Belgian, British and Swiss companies.  That same 
year, the FRR unveiled a list of its five SRI principles and nominated three CSR ratings 
agencies, including the French Vigeo, to assess how its five SRI principles were respected by 
the asset managers managing its SRI funds. 
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In 2006, the ERAFP board – composed of civil servants, labour and management 
representatives nominated by the French State for a three year period – met every two months 
to finalize the draft of its SRI charter and to debate how the charter would be practically 
implemented via an in-house ‘SRI matrix’ (‘Référentiel ISR’).  Novethic was invited to attend 
the ERAFP board meetings in its capacity of CDC internal SRI consultant, the CDC being in 
charge of the administrative but also financial management of the ERAFP bond portfolios.  
More than 30 asset managers answered the ERAFP call to manage equity portfolios.  A 
year later, after a short listing of 16 candidates, the ERAFP finally selected 2 prominent 
French SRI asset managers:  BNP Paribas AM and IDEAM, the SRI subsidiary of Credit 
Agricole Asset Management.  In addition, the ERAFP issued a tender call for a CSR rating 
agency that would be in charge of managing its ‘SRI matrix’, a tool that allows screening 
through non-financial criteria and weighting of the stocks in its portfolio.  This decision 
further altered calculative capacity distribution within the market (I.51). 
When we won the ERAFP call for tender to manage the SRI matrix, we knew that asset 
managers would have to come back to us. They will have to pay the 70.000 euros we 
asked for our CSR ratings. Indeed if you wanted to get the chance one day to win an 
investment mandate from the ERAFP, you will have to have a clear knowledge of the 
Vigeo CSR rating system since the ERAFP SRI matrix resulted in being completely 
linked to the Vigeo CSR rating system. (Vigeo ex-employee, interview November 2013) 
Thanks to these power moves by macro actors in relation to calculative agency, Vigeo 
was again repositioned as an ‘obligatory passage point’ for asset managers.  At the end of 
2006 (Table 1), Vigeo reached its highest market share since its creation in 2002: 62%. 
Micro Actor Attempt to Recapture the Lead in SRI Market Development  
Vigeo not only achieved quasi-domination of the market thanks to moves by macro actors that 
consolidated its institutional investor client base, but the calculative agency also pro-actively 
engaged in moves to exploit the calculative asymmetries between asset managers and their 
ultimate clients.  To make its business model financially sustainable based on its CSR ratings 
services for investors, Vigeo drastically increased the membership fees for asset managers, 
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leading to some resistance on their part.  Vigeo’s newly hired management team was aware 
that a ‘belligerent mood’ was rising among asset managers (I.51, I40).  According to several 
of our interviewees, this tension led to an attempt by some asset managers to incentivize their 
traditional information providers, the brokers, to provide an alternative source of CSR 
information by increasing their brokerage fees (La Tribune, 10/05/2005). 
With the arrival of Nicole Notat, price structures on the CSR market in France changed.  
Prices went up drastically, which did not please French asset managers.  In my opinion, 
this is why from that moment they pushed so hard for brokers to get into the game, so 
that CSR information would be part of the package of services they already provided.  
But actually considering the costs of creating a CSR information database, you cannot 
say today that brokers are in competition with CSR information providers.  Actually, we 
could become their clients to get primary CSR data that we could then analyse ourselves. 
(Interview with Broker, 2005) 
Vigeo was also actively on the lookout for a way to exercise its power over its reluctant 
and narrow French investor client base and to consolidate the influence of its calculative 
practices within the marketplace.  To this end, its business team developed the ‘PLANET 
RATINGS®’ project.  PLANET RATINGS® was supposed to calculate the aggregated CSR 
quality of stocks included in the European equities investment portfolios commercialized in 
France based on the Vigeo CSR ratings system.  This new project’s successful outcome was 
envisioned by Vigeo as follows: asset managers will have to pay a fee when they use 
PLANET RATINGS® for communication and advertisement purposes, and this will lead a 
larger pool of investors to buy the Vigeo rating services to obtain a good ‘planet rating’.  
Vigeo partnered with Morningstar, an organisation specialized in financial ratings that could 
provide access to the equity funds’ exact portfolio stock compositions without having to ask 
asset managers to disclose information, which they were known to be reluctant to 
communicate (Hawken, 2004).  The leadership of Vigeo also widened the partnership to 
Novethic, which ended up playing a relatively minor role in this project. 
This project failed because it triggered an aggressive boycott by asset managers, who 
collectively exercised their power against the rating agency.  These managers were 
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determined to prevent Vigeo from consolidating its market power by having the final word 
about the CSR quality of their own CSR calculative practices. 
We use at least 3 CSR information providers to build our internal analysis on the 
companies we invest in. I do not see how a rating system built on the CSR ratings of only 
one of my CSR information providers can give any true measurement of the overall CSR 
quality of our fund. And what if I was not using Vigeo at all? (Participatory observation 
field notes, 17/05/05, Paris, Asset manager’s comments during the public presentation of 
PLANET RATINGS®) 
Power Moves and Calculability in Period 3 
This period of market stabilization suggests that even though actors such as CSR rating 
agencies and asset managers constitute sites of power and can, at the micro level, engage their 
calculative capacities to consolidate and expand their influence over or against other 
calculative agencies, competitive dynamics make it difficult to establish and exploit lasting 
calculative asymmetries.  Neither Vigeo through its ‘Planet Rating’ project nor asset 
managers through the inclusion of brokers was able to reshape calculative practices.  Rather, 
the strategies of macro actors such as the ERAFP and the FRR were central to the 
consolidation of lasting power positions for the calculative agencies in the markets during this 
period.  These macro actors operated either over or through calculative agencies by grating 
‘rights to calculate’ on their behalf to specific CSR rating agencies (e.g., Vigeo) as well as 
‘rights to manage SRI’ to specific asset managers (e.g., IDEAM).  As a result of these macro-
actors’ domination power moves, Vigeo maintained its status of ‘obligatory passage point’ 
(Callon, 1986; Clegg, 1989). 
Accordingly, macro forces emerging during the emergence and consolidation periods of 
market development, such as the legalization of the market emerging from the active lobbying 
of macro actors (e.g., governmental and public bodies as well pro-SRI labour unions), played 
a crucial role in the subsequent definition of how power played against, over or through 
calculative agencies by empowering the two public institutional investors that could 
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consolidate or undermine the power positions of specific calculative agencies on the SRI 
market. 
Discussion, Implications and Conclusions 
Our empirical account of the emergence, consolidation and mainstreaming of the French SRI 
market elucidates some of the processes whereby actors’ power games at the micro and macro 
levels interact to shape the constitution of a new market.  In contributing by clarifying how 
power and calculability interface in the process of market construction, this study has resulted 
in a number of insights into how power is engaged through calculability and how calculative 
agencies act as a central ‘nexus’ connecting the micro and macro dynamics of power 
constitution in the process of market building.  We discuss below the theoretical implications 
of these findings and suggest areas for future research. 
How Power Plays through Calculative Agencies 
Our findings first contribute to power studies in organizational analysis by enriching current 
understanding of how power interfaces with calculability.  Prior studies of how power plays 
through calculability have primarily relied on a Foucauldian view of power as 
‘subjectification’, which emphasizes the constitution of subjects through calculative agencies 
and calculative practices (Miller, 1992; Power & Miller, 2013) and de facto neglects other 
facets of power such as those conceptualized by Lukes (2005).  For Miller (1992), calculative 
indicators are usually ‘loosely related to each other’, and their failure to evaluate is not 
problematic as their mere existence suffices to support a neo-liberal mode of governance.  
Lukes (2005) convincingly argued that such views ‘de-face’ power by neglecting to 
investigate who mobilizes power and by overlooking the fact that attempts to mobilize power 
through calculability may succeed or fail, and this may matter, especially in a marketplace 
context. 
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In contrast with prior Foucauldian perspectives, our analysis documents how calculative 
agencies actively produce, mobilize or support three alternative forms of power – coercion, 
manipulation or domination – through their activities in the marketplace and show how actors 
exercise their power over, through or against these calculative agencies.  Table II provides a 
summary of the main power moves related to calculative agencies documented at each period 
through our longitudinal account, showing which actors engage which facet of power in 
relation to the calculative agencies and, more importantly, whether these mobilizations of 
power succeeded or failed. 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
Several patterns emerge from this analysis, providing new insights for the analysis of 
how power plays through calculability.  First, our results suggest that calculability involves 
the production of power and that calculative agencies actively mobilize the power they 
constitute.  Calculative agencies emerged as sites of power construction that compete with 
each other (through moves over or against other agencies) to shape calculative asymmetries to 
their own benefit. They may engage autonomously in multiple forms of power to consolidate 
their position.  According to our findings, manipulation, notably through repositioning to 
become an ‘obligatory passage point’ (Callon, 1986; Clegg, 1989), was the dominant facet of 
power engaged by calculative agencies such as Arese / Vigeo or asset managers to consolidate 
their position in the SRI marketplace, whereas coercion and domination were used to a lesser 
extent and usually less successfully by these micro actors.  Micro actors’ capacity to establish 
their position ‘by themselves’ indeed appears to be relatively limited: in our case, they 
depended upon their capacity to connect with macro actors to achieve lasting central 
positions. 
A second pattern suggests that calculative agencies do not always succeed in achieving 
power and that specific attempts from calculative agencies to enhance their power can be 
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undermined and/or resisted, notably by other calculative agencies.  Indeed, we noticed 
several failed attempts to resist calculability (e.g., asset managers, Periods 2 and 3).  These 
failures, such as the inability of MNCs to resist the calculative agency’s imposed rating 
(Period 1), could be interpreted by relying on an approach to power as ‘subjectification’:  the 
neo-liberal ‘ideology of numbers’ certainly facilitated the acceptance of the CSR or SRI 
rating concept by MNCs and asset managers (Chelli & Gendron, 2013). 
Yet, even though all calculative agencies benefited from the traction of a dominant 
‘ideology of numbers’ in financial markets, not all of their power moves were successful, as 
shown for instance by their inability to impose new calculative practices through domination 
or manipulation (e.g., brokers’ project by asset managers and Vigeo’s planet rating project by 
the CSR rating agency in Period 3).  Our results suggest that subjectification and the 
‘systemic power’ it creates could play in relation to other forms of power such as coercion, 
domination and manipulation.  Manipulation and domination (e.g., mobilization of media, 
construction of strong institutional links) appear to be more likely to be successful when 
deployed by and through calculative agencies, as shown by the establishment of the principle 
of CSR ratings in Period 1 or the imposition of the SRI rating concept in Period 2.   
A third pattern that emerges from the comparison of power deployment across the three 
periods of SRI market construction is as follows: calculative agencies were systematically 
seen by macro actors such as labour unions, state-owned banks, or public pension funds as 
crucial ‘sites of power’ to be controlled to shape the market.  Macro actors aimed to exercise 
their control over or through these agencies, and most attempts to exercise power through 
manipulation or domination that we documented from macro towards micro actors were 
successful, at least temporarily (see Table II).  The labour unions as well as the ERAFP and 
FRR completely redistributed calculative capacities to build their positions in the market, thus 
reshaping the calculative asymmetries that are central to calculative agencies’ power 
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deployment throughout the three stages of market development.  This suggests that solely 
examining macro actors’ politics in relation to rule making or governance structure may not 
fully capture the process of market construction (Fligstein, 1996, 2001), as these activities 
may have to focus on calculative agencies and practices to effectively influence market 
making and consolidate power positions. 
As a whole, our analysis demonstrates the relevancy of Lukes’ (2005) perspective on 
power to uncover how beyond subjectification, power plays through calculability via 
manipulation, domination and, to a lesser extent, coercion.  Our results indicate the need to 
more systematically consider ‘calculability as politics’ in the process of market construction. 
Hence, these results point toward the profound yet neglected political and critical potential of 
the performativity agenda to uncover how power plays out within markets through the 
permanent shaping and reshaping of calculative asymmetries and the materialization of 
calculative devices (Vosselman, 2014).  Future studies could leverage this insight to ‘unpack’ 
the micro dynamics of multiple forms of power constitution by focusing on prominent 
calculative agencies within and across markets beyond the case of Socially Responsible 
Investment.   
Bridging the Micro and Macro Dynamics of Market Making 
In line with recent calls (Poon, 2009; Van Hoyweghen, 2014), a second contribution of our 
study is to the social and organizational studies of markets by showing how the activities of 
calculative agencies connect the micro process of power constitution through calculability at 
the agency level to the macro-level power strategies of actors such as labour unions or state 
owned banks involved in political debates related to macro social and political issues such as 
the creation and management of public pension funds.  Following the political studies of the 
market à la Fligstein, our narrative suggests that major macro actors such state-owned banks, 
governments and labour unions with vested interests in the existence (or failure) of an SRI 
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market played a central role in its constitution by shaping its legal context and even creating 
de facto some of its most powerful investment players.  Yet, our results also show that the 
power of macro actors was mainly exercised through the active construction and mobilization 
of calculative agencies.  Calculative agencies evaluating the ‘socially responsible quality’ of 
stocks led to the purposive design of SRI funds at the early stage of market construction, 
confirming the necessity of engaging in calculative activities to ‘bring into being’ a new 
market, as suggested by the tenants of the ‘performativity of the economics’ thesis (Callon, 
1998; Callon & Muniesa, 2005). 
More specifically, Table II shows the presence of a recurrent cycle moving first top 
down, from macro actors towards the calculative infrastructure, to enable the production of 
market activities, and then bottom up, from calculative practices to the macro context, through 
the enrolment and mobilization of calculative agencies in activities consolidating market 
construction, such as the constitution of a new legal framework between Periods I and II.  In 
parallel, the constitution of calculative agencies created new ‘power sites’ at the micro level 
of analysis that macro actors aimed to either capture or to influence to drive the process of 
market building and to align it with their own vested interests. 
Our study hence seeks to sketch a richer theorization of how micro and macro dynamics 
of actors influence interplay in the process of market making through the mediation of 
calculative agencies (Krippner, 2005; Poon, 2009) and also through the autonomous 
development of those calculative capacities by calculative agencies that provide them with 
power.  In so doing, we address two lasting concerns of the ‘market-as-politics’ and ‘market-
as-calculative device’ streams of studies.  First, our results suggest that macro actors, even 
when they are especially powerful (e.g., CÉ and the CDC in our case), can hardly build new 
markets without regulating calculability and/or actively mobilizing calculative agencies from 
these markets.  To some extent, our analysis suggests adding to Fligstein’s view of markets a 
40 
 
‘conception of calculative forms of control’ as a core ingredient in the process of market 
construction together with ‘governance rules’ and the ‘concept of corporate control’ 
(Fligstein, 1990, 1996).  Second, our theorization of the autonomous deployment of the power 
game by calculative agencies also moves the performativity studies of markets beyond their 
current focus on the process of ‘market stabilization’ (Orverdevest, 2011) by acknowledging 
the emerging, disruptive and uncertain nature of calculative agencies’ attempts to expand and 
consolidate their influence through calculative practices.  Calculative agencies, although 
powerful, can fail to consolidate and enhance their domination over other market actors, the 
maintenance of their position involves continuous work, and their status can be radically 
transformed through macro interventions, as we have observed in our case during the second 
and last period of market development. 
As a whole, our study illustrates the value of cross-fertilizing performativity and power 
studies of markets and organizations to theorize the processes whereby calculability and 
power interact.  In considering multiple facets of power – beyond subjectification – to 
investigate how calculative agencies, tools and devices are involved in the political 
constitution of markets, our analysis usefully complements current approaches to 
‘calculability as government’ by uncovering the potential role of micro-level ‘calculative 
lobbying’ and of macro-level ‘government of calculability’ in market construction.  We hope 
this broader theoretical perspective on ‘calculability as politics’ will stimulate further research 
on the making of markets, within and beyond the context of socially responsible investing. 
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Figure 1. The Take-off and Development of the French SRI Market* 
 
 
*Source: Novethic Barometer in June 2003 for annual availability of SRI mutual funds in France. 
Values before 2003 are estimated based on other secondary sources (Association Francaise de Gestion, AFG). 
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TABLE I. Key Metrics and Changes in the French SRI Market 2003-2009* 
Indicators** December 2003 December 2004 December 2005 December 2006 December 2007 December 2008 December 2009  
Amount of : 
SRI asset managers 
SRI funds 
SRI assets 
% fixed income 
 
 
48  
108  
4,4 billions 
17% fixed income 
49 
122 
5 billions 
18% fixed income 
 
44 
128 
9,8 billions 
27% fixed income 
 
45 
137 
12,4 billions 
29% fixed income 
 
48  
175 
20 billions 
23% fixed income  
  
 
60  
232  
20 billions  
45% RI fixed income 
 
 
63 
262  
33 billions  
64% fixed income  
The 3 leading asset 
managers on the 
French SRI market 
(AUM in billions 
Euros) 
-BNP PAM (0,9) 
-Dexia AM (0,8) 
-UBS (0,4) 
- Dexia AM (1) 
-BNP PAM (0,9) 
-Macif Gestion (0,6) 
-Dexia AM (3) 
-AGF AM (1,5) 
-BNP PAM (1,2) 
-Dexia AM (2,5) 
-Natexis AM (2) 
- AGF AM (1,3) 
- Natixis AM (3,2) 
- Dexia AM (2,5)  
- Robeco (2,4) 
-Allianz GI (2,9) 
-Natixis AM (2,7) 
-Dexia AM (2,4) 
-Amundi (8)  
-Natixis (3,5) 
-Allianz GI (9) 
CSR ratings agency 
leaders (clients share) 
Vigeo: 46% 
Innovest: 5% 
Eiris : 9% 
Vigeo: 47% 
Innovest: 10% 
Eiris: 13% 
Vigeo: 59% 
Innovest: 18% 
Eiris: 11% 
Vigeo: 62% 
Innovest: 24% 
Eiris: 9%  
Vigeo: 58% 
Innovest :27% 
Eiris: 6% 
Vigeo:52% 
Innovest: 32% 
Eiris: 14%  
Vigeo: 45% 
Risk Metrics (Innovest 
shares): 38% 
Asset 4: 14% 
Eiris: 14% 
 
Number of CSR 
rating agency used by 
asset managers 
0: 10% 
1: 46% 
2 : 19%  
3 and more: 10% 
Not known: 15% 
  
0: 8% 
1: 47% 
2: 23% 
3 and more: 16% 
Not known: 6%  
0: 5% 
1: 48% 
2: 18% 
3 and more: 20% 
Not known: 9% 
0: 2% 
1: 42% 
2: 25% 
3 and more: 22% 
Not known: 9% 
0: 2% 
1: 33% 
2: 25% 
3 and more: 27% 
Not known: 13% 
Not available via 
Novethic barometer  
Not available via 
Novethic barometer 
Size of SRI team at 
asset management 
team 
No team: 40% 
1: 17% 
2 : 21% 
3 and more: 10% 
Not known: 12% 
No team: 35% 
1: 23% 
2 : 22%  
3 and more: 14% 
Not known: 6% 
No team: 32% 
1: 25% 
2 : 23%  
3 and more: 13% 
Not known: 7% 
No team: 36% 
1: 18% 
2 : 36%  
3 and more: 13% 
Not known: 4% 
No team: 33% 
1: 19% 
2 : 21%  
3 and more: 19% 
Not known: 4% 
 
Not available via 
Novethic barometer 
Not available via 
Novethic barometer 
*Sources: Novethic December SRI Barometers 2003 to 2011 
** Abbreviations: SRI: Socially Responsible Investment; AM: Asset Management. 
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Table II. Overview of the Main Uses of Power* 
 Period 1 – Market Emergence (1997-2002) Period 2 – Market Consolidation (2003-2005) Period 3 – Market Stabilization (2005-2008) 
Facets / Uses 
of power 
Coercion Manipulation Domination Coercion Manipulation Domination Coercion Manipulation Domination 
POWER OF 
CALCULATIVE 
AGENCIES 
 Positioning of 
Arese as an 
obligatory passage 
point in the 
calculative 
network 
[Temporary 
success] 
  CSR rating 
agencies and asset 
managers struggle 
to be at the centre 
of the calculative 
chain [No clear 
outcome] 
Macro-actors 
bounded to the 
establishment of 
the principle of 
CSR ratings and of 
a SRI market 
[Success] 
 Reinforcement of 
the power of CSR 
calculative 
agencies as the 
existence of a 
large SRI market 
is secured 
[Success] 
Acceptance of  the 
creation of public 
pension funds 
(FRR, ERAFP) 
facilitated by the 
existence of SRI 
[Temporary 
success] 
POWER OVER 
CALCULATIVE 
AGENCIES 
 
Power of Arese 
over asset 
managers due to 
the calculative 
asymmetry 
[Temporary 
success] 
   Trade unionist 
Nicole Notat 
captures the Arese 
calculative agency 
through her 
network (Vigeo) 
and changes its 
governance 
[Success] 
  ERAPF and FRR 
take power over 
asset managers 
through their SRI 
call for tenders 
[Success] 
Vigeo attempts at 
dominating asset 
managers 
[Failure] 
POWER 
THROUGH 
CALCULATIVE 
AGENCIES 
 Mobilization of 
Arese and her 
leaders to promote 
the Law on New 
Economic 
Regulations 
[Success] 
Creation of Arese 
by CDC and CÉ to 
promote the 
constitution of a 
market for 
employees’ 
savings and 
pension funds 
[Success] 
 Novethic create a 
calculative agency 
to define the 
qualities of an ISR 
fund [Success] 
CIES (labour 
unions) use of 
labels to shift 
calculative 
asymmetries in the 
market to the 
benefit of asset 
managers 
[Success] 
 
CDC consolidates 
SRI market 
through the 
creation of 
Novethic 
[Success] 
 FRR and ERAPF 
use Vigeo to 
design a new SRI 
matrix [Success] 
 
Labour unions 
imprint their 
interests in the 
FRR and ERAPF 
[Success] 
 
POWER 
AGAINST 
CALCULATIVE 
AGENCIES 
Resistance to the 
CSR ratings from 
a French MNC 
[Failure] 
Attempt at 
manipulating CSR 
ratings through 
agency [Failure] 
 Resistance to 
Novethic from 
fund managers 
[Failure] 
Férone creates a 
competing agency 
and contest the 
Vigeo model 
[Failure] 
 Direct resistance 
of asset managers 
to ‘Planet Rating’ 
[Temporary 
success]  
Asset managers 
undermine Vigeo 
by bringing-in 
brokers [Partial 
failure] 
 
*Abbreviations: CDC: Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations; CE: Caisse d’Épargne; CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility; ERAPF: Établissement pour la Retraite 
Additionnelle de la Fonction Publique FRR: Fonds de Reserve des Retraites; MNC: Multinational Corporations; SRI: Socially Responsible Investment.
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Appendix A – List of Interviews 
Organization Function of the Interviewees  Length and type (V = In-
Vivo; R = Retrospective) 
CSR rating agencies (12) 
1. Arese Former CEO of Arese 1h00 (R) 
2. Arese Analyst / in charge of the method (3 meetings) 7h00 (R)  
3. Arese/Vigeo Analyst 1h30 (R) 
4. Arese/Vigeo Analyst 1h30 (R) 
5. Arese Analyst 1h00 (R) 
6. Arsese Analysts and Business Development Manager 1h00 (R) 
7. Arese/Vigeo Analyst 1h30 (R) 
8. Arese Anlayst 1h00 (R) 
9. Standard’s and Poors Financial Analyst 30 mVn (R) 
10. Core Ratings Analyst 2h00 (V) 
11. CFIE Head (2 meetings) 2h00 (R) 
12. Vigeo (former Arese) Analyst  1h30 (V) 
Asset Managers (27) 
13. ABF  Fund Manager 1h00 (V) 
14. AG2R RI Analyst 2h10 (V) 
15. Banque Populaire Asset manager 1h00 (V) 
16. BFT Gestion  Asset manager 1h00 (V) 
17. BNP PAM  Asset manager 1h00 (V) 
18. BNP PAM Head of the RI analysts team 2h00 (V) 
19. CAAM  Asset manager 2h00 (V) 
20. Caisse d’Epargne Asset Manager  30 mVn (R) 
21. CLAM Asset Manager (RI) 1h00 (R) 
22. Credit Cooperatif  Asset manager 1h00 (V) 
23. Credit Cooperatif  Asset manager 1h00 (R) 
24. Groupama  Asset manager 1h10 (V) 
25. HSBC  Asset manager 2h00 (V) 
26. HSBC AM  Asset manager 2h00 (V) 
27. IDEAM  Bond Fund manager 1h00 (V) 
28. IDEAM  Fund manager 1h00 (V) 
29. IDEAM Head of RI Research  3h00 (V) 
30. IDEAM  RI analyst 2h00 (V) 
31. IONIS  RI analyst 1h30 (V) 
32. Macif Gestion/  CEO and Fund manager  2h30 (V) 
33. Meeschaert Fund manager 2h00 (V) 
34. Meeschaert Fund Manager and RI analyst 2h30 (V) 
35. Prado Epargne RI team  40 mVn (R) 
36. Sarasin Expertise Fund manager 1h00 (V) 
37. Sogesposte Asset manager 1h00 (V) 
38. Sogeposte  Head of RI  1h00 (V) 
39. UBS Asset Manager  40 mVn (R) 
Other key stakeholder of the French RI field (10) 
40. CIC-Securities – Broker Head of SRI Research  2h30 (V) 
41. Caisse des Dépôts Technical Expert  30mVn (R) 
42. Insurance Compnay (CAC 40) Head of CSR / sustainable development 1h00 (R) 
43. Bank Company (CAC 40) Head of CSR / sustainable development 1h00 (R) 
44. Energy Company (CAC 40) Head of CSR / sustainable development 40mVn (R) 
45. Consultancy (Paris) Consultant having worked for Arese 1h00 (R) 
46. Consultancy (California) Head of consultancy whithin which former 
Arese CEO worked 
45mVn (R) 
47. AFG-ASSFI Head of a French think-tank on RI  1h00 (R) 
48. CDC / Novethic Administrator of Arese (1999-2002) 40mVn (R) 
49. ONU Former member of the Arese board (CDC) 1h00 (R) 
Total French Case 49 persons in 33 different organizations 60h15mVn (24R; 25 V) 
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Appendix B: Selection of news articles extracted from generalist and financial press and 
used to build the case narrative 
Journal  Date  Main topic  
CSR information calculative devices  
La Tribune  30/05/1997 CSR analysis challenges: Arese launch  
Le Point  17/09/1999 CSR analysis challenges: Arese launch 
Le Monde  27/10/1999 CSR analysis and RI funds growth  
Les Echos  03/12/1999 CSR analysis and RI funds growth 
Le Monde 26/08/2002 CSR rating agencies competition: Vigeo launch  
Liberation  14/10/2002 CSR rating agencies competition: Vigeo launch  
Le Monde 11/12/2002 CSR rating agencies competition: Vigeo launch  
Le Monde 14/01/2003 CSR analysis challenges: Vigeo business model  
La Tribune 24/01/2003 CSR rating agencies competition: a market for CSR info  
La Tribune  11/03/2003 CSR rating agencies competition: a market for CSR info  
Le Monde  06/11/2003 CSR rating agencies competition: Vigeo rise  
La Tribune  13/11/2003 CSR analysis challenges  
La Tribune  10/06/2005  CSR analysis and brokers  
La Tribune  15/03/2006  CSR analysis and brokers  
La Tribune  27/06/2008 CSR rating agencies competition 
RI funds calculative devices and CIES Label 
La Tribune  12/03/2002 Label CIES RI requirements  
La Tribune  19/03/2002 Label CIES RI requirements  
La Tribune  08/04/2002 Label CIES RI requirements  
La Tribune  10/04/2002 Label CIES first round selection results  
Le Monde  11/04/2002 Label CIES first round selection results 
La Tribune  06/06/2002  Label CIES second selection round results 
La Tribune  11/06/2002 Label CIES second selection round results 
Le Monde  12/06/2002 Label CIES second selection round results 
La Tribune  17/12/2002 Label CIES third round selection process  
La Tribune  04/03/2003 Label CIES third round selection process  
La Tribune  17/03/2003 Label CIES third round selection results  
Le Monde  02/06/2003 Label CIES RI requirements  
Le Monde  10/05/2004 Label CIES RI requirements  
Le Monde  25/10/2004 Label CIES RI requirements  
La Tribune  07/05/2005  Launch of new CIES labellisation campaign and RI requirements 
Novethic  
Le Monde Argent  01/11/2004 Novethic RI rating  
Le Monde Argent 13/12/2004 Novethic RI rating 
Le Monde  26/09/2006 Novethic RI rating 
Le Monde  11/ 10/2007 Novethic RI rating 
Le Monde  11/05/2008 Novethic RI rating to be turned in a label  
RI commitment of state owned fund: ERAFP/FRR  
L’Agefi  11/03/2004 FRR and RI  
Le Figaro Economie  12/03/2004 FRR and RI  
La Tribune  28/06/2005 FRR and RI  
Le Monde  29/06/2005 FRR and RI  
La Tribune  30/08/2005  FRR and RI market growth  
La Tribune 05/11/2005 RI rise and state owned funds  
Le Monde  09/01/2007 ERAFP and CSR information provider  
La Tribune  30/01/2007 ERAFP and RI  
La Tribune  04/07/2006 ERAFP and RI  
La Tribune  14/03/2007 ERAFP and RI asset manager selection  
La Tribune  20/03/2007 ERAFP and RI  
Source: Nexis Databasis.  
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Appendix C. Chronology of Key Events 
Year Regulative / Governance Context  Calculability Domain 
1997-8  Creation of ARESE as a joint venture 
by Caisses d Epargne and Caisse des 
Depots 
1999  Launch of first RI funds using ARESE 
CSR Ratings: ABF Eurosocietale , 
Macif Sustainable Growth, Ecureuil 
1,2,3 Future  
2001 19 February: Law 2001-152: Employee Saving Scheme 
(FCPE) are obliged to disclose how they take ethical, social 
and environmental criteria into account in their investment 
decision/exercise of shareholder right 
May 2001: Law 2001-420 makes the obligation for French 
listed companies to publish CSR information in their annual 
reports compulsory 
July 2001: Law 2001-624 creates the FRR, the first French 
public retirement fund requires that the investment policy 
general orientation disclose how ethical, social, 
environmental factors are taken into account  
August 2003: French retirement Law (‘Fillon Law’) 
implements a legal framework to promote pension funds.  
Sept 2001: Creation of Novethic, 
subsidiary of Caisse des Dépôts  
2002 January: In the framework of the Fabius Law, 4 French trade 
unions (CFDT, CFTC, CGC, CGT) create an inter union 
committee for employee savings, the CIES and create a new 
label for RI products 
 
Vigeo is created by Nicole Notat ex 
secretary of CFDT major French trade 
union  
Creation of Core Ratings by Genevieve 
Ferone ex director of Arese  
Launch of Novethic RI Ratings  
First run of the CIES label 
2003 July: FRR call for tender on active equities portfolios with 
some minor RI requirements 
US Innovest and British EIRIS enter the 
French RI Market 
Second Run of the CIES label  
2004 Following the Fillon Law, ERAFP, the first French State 
owned pension fund, becomes functional  
 
2005 FRR call for tender for RI Managers  
ERAFP publicly convert to RI  
Vigeo buys the Belgian group Ethibel 
and becomes Vigeo Group 
Launch of the Enhanced Analytic 
Initiative 
Innovest buys Core Ratings 
March ; Planet Ratings Project by 
Novethic, Vigeo and Morningstar 
2006 April: ERAPF call for tender to hire a CSR rating agency for 
defining an internal RI strategy on fixed income  
May: Unveiling of the successful AM for the FRR call for 
tender  
June: ERAFP call for tender for RI asset managers on listed 
equities  
October: ERAPF selects Oekom and Vigeo Group to work on 
RI fixed income portfolios. 
Group Vigeo buys Avanzi SRI 
Research and becomes Vigeo SAS  
Broadening of the Novethic rating to RI 
fixed income products 
2007 May: Unveiling of the list of AM winner for the ERAFP call 
for tender  
Oekom German group sign an alliance 
with Vigeo to cater for ERAFP call on 
fixed income assets 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
i
 To facilitate the reading of the narrative, we use abbreviations to refer to specific interviewees.  The letter ‘I’ 
stands for ‘Interviewee’ and number indicated refers the number reported in the list of interviews provided in 
Appendix A. 
ii
 The CAC 40 is a financial index used as a benchmark French stock market index.  This index represents a 
capitalization-weighted measure of the 40 most significant values among the 100 highest market capitalizations 
on the Euronext Paris (formerly the Bourse of Paris).  Its composition is reported on the Euronext website: 
https://indices.euronext.com/en/products/indices/FR0003500008-XPAR. 
